Philosophy of Religion - Hell, Labels, and Agnosticism

Today I'm going to make an attempt to flesh out my philosophy of religion (and perhaps my religion itself). This is a huge topic which I know that I cannot just outline or try to write an 8-page paper on. At least not right now, when I'm starting school, but also when I haven't developed it nearly to my satisfaction. So I'm going to start with some short (~2-5 page) papers, each on a particular subject of philosophy of religion. I'm definitely not going to be able to be systematic in this, but I plan on synthesizing (and expanding on) these topics in the future. Today I think I'll start off by discussing my general views on the idea of religion as personal identity.

The notion of a person following or not following a particular religion is so universally accepted that it may seem strange to scrutinize or question it. However, the onset of modernity and globalization has forced religions to interact in a way that civilization seems to be relatively unused to (i.e., tolerating, by choice or not, one another's existence). We now live in a world of more or less competing religions, where instead of sending swords to deal with infidels, they must stick with missionaries.

To many followers of the Western religions (and of course with non-followers) this relative nonaggression toward other religious traditions is seen as an improvement, since they believe that conversion-by-the-sword is the wrong way to inspire a change in a person's soul. Instead they advocate a more moderate, 'respect others' wills' approach. Others see more aggressive tactics (violent or not) as integral to missionary work, because the salvation from hell takes priority over being nice or tolerant of a person wishes.

It is interesting that this concern with hellfire may have much to do with how we define ourselves. If you are a non-Christian, you risk suffering the wrath of Jehova. If you are a non-Muslim, you risk a similar fate at the hands of Allah. This puts a stark difference between the non-Christian and Christian, non-Muslim and Muslim. It makes the issue black and white, a matter of either falling into an abyss or being saved. Interestingly, Jews neither have a hell nor actively attempt to convert people. Jewish identity is more complex than other conceptions of religious identity, for it has ties to culture and ethnicity that are not necessarily found in most others.

If you're reading this, you're probably like me in that you either don't believe in hell or believe that if it does exist it is not the hell of popular conception (eternal fire burning all unrepentant sinners). There are many reasons for this: disbelief in God or the supernatural, belief that God's benevolence contradicts notions of eternal (perhaps even temporal) judgment, etc. The rest of this essay will more or less assume this in order to draw out implications to be had from disbelief in eternal hell (though I might comment on reasons for this in a later work). Whatever reason for agreeing with this point, its potential implications are important: religious identity perhaps need not be so stark of a contrast between those who follow certain practices and hold certain beliefs and those who don't.

Obviously more has shaped religious identity than belief concerning hell. Ideas about meaning, the way the world works, etc. have shaped such an understanding. Whether or not religious identity has been shaped by Western conceptions of religion is something I am not prepared to comment on, due to my own ignorance on the subject and evidence either way. However, with the view that being a non-believer does not have eternal consequences for a person's soul, it seems that the distinction between religions may be relaxed in favor of comparing and contrasting, and incorporating elements of one another.

It is with this in mind that I have approached religion for some time now. Incorporating elements of Christianity, Buddhism, Gnosticism, and even atheist and pantheist ideas, I have come to have a rather complex (not necessarily sophisticated) view of religion. I have also incorporated scientific understanding and ideas like deep ecology to an extent. With this in mind, I have to ask: am I a Christian, a Buddhist, a pantheist, an agnostic, all, none, some? Perhaps such terms are useful in understanding what has shaped my perspective. But none of these really define me, give me a sense of purpose and identity in and of themselves. It is because of this that I gave up trying to define myself, because it was ultimately too restricting to force myself to think within a certain paradigm.

Oftentimes labels become less useful as an issue grows less absolute. Religion seems to be much more complex than a debate between theists and atheists, and framing the issue as such can be detrimental to both involved parties. However, I'm not necessarily convinced that taking no stance on the matter is the right way to go about it. It seems entirely possible to support a particular position without letting it define oneself. In other words, to say "I don't know what God is, understand this world, or know what my purpose is, but I've got a general idea and I'm going to live my life while trying to figure it all out" without needing a label to define it.

Of course, perhaps the question we should ask here is if identity is something that we should have or not have. On the one hand, it's a reason for conflict among the religious, and if a distinction is lost between religions a great reason for hatred and separation could be undone. On the other hand, identity can be a way to present a coherent worldview and way of life that gives both individual and shared purpose. The task seems to be in understanding if we can have purpose and coherence without division, which would seem more desirable than having all of these things.

Frankly, yes we can. Besides the fact that I know that myself and others around me do this on a daily basis, it's a well thought-out aspect of Buddhist psychology that if one dissolves one's ego or extensions thereof, then conflict will naturally settle. This peace is not without purpose, but is inherently valuable. It is perfectly fine to say that I have no religion, but derive purpose, culture, and understanding from wherever I find it.

This is not to say that the idea of a Christian tradition, Buddhist tradition, etc. isn't helpful in making one's source of thought coherent. It is useful to understand some basic ideas and beliefs that can help lead one to wisdom. And it would be missing the point to say that we should combine traditions into a 'unified religion'. The idea (whether one accepts it or not) is to let go of religious identity, not combine different ones (which would ultimately just make a new one).

Now if one believes that he/she should give up their identity as a Christian, Hindu, etc., it does not mean that they need give up their values, their beliefs, or really anything more than a label and the notion of exclusivity. I feel that, while it is of course up to individual choice, this practice should be standard for how we treat religion. Instead of calling ourselves and our children Muslim or Buddhist, we should think of religion as a personal commitment that doesn't fit simply into categories. It's a mode of being and living that simply is a part of the human condition, and there is no need for it to be more of a source of conflict than differences in music taste.

As a final note, I think it is fair to end this by keeping with the idea of not letting ideology define you, but still looking to give some description of religious ideas, by giving a bit about what I believe. I have dodged such a question in my own mind for some time now, but I will give it here in brief.

In short, I am what I call a 'positive agnostic'. Agnosticism has a perception of being a weak position, where one simply ignores the question of religion. Here, I do the same thing, but defend such a (non-)position by arguing that humanity's position is one where knowledge is a scarce resource. Our ideas about the divine and of the universe may be completely off, and to pretend certainty about anything pertaining to these would be a ridiculous venture. Maybe we can come to know such things, but I don't wish to give unnecessary credibility to positions which confirm or deny ideas concerning the divine.

Not to say that I don't have some ideas about the divine. I think God is 'the answer to the question implied in being', the meaning given to one's existence. From this perspective I seek to understand God.

I'm also one who disbelieves in the notion of self, which helps to shape my ethical stances. I am a utilitarian, though it might be fair to call me a negative utilitarian* (I am more focused with reducing suffering than maximizing pleasure, and I believe that happiness is much different from attaining pleasure). This mode of ethical thought is not grounded in God's commands, due to the problem raised by the Euthyphro dilemma.

Besides this, I believe in trying to live a good life like Jesus did. Jesus had a profound impact on the way I shaped myself and he still does today.

That's all I can say for now, because I'm tired and I haven't thought it all out completely. But I think it's a start.

*Edit on September 1st: Due to my working out some of the problems with this school of thought, I've decided to go with the distinction of "Non-hedonistic utilitarianism", which views the good as that which maximizes happiness. Happiness here is a stable condition that is distinct from pain and pleasure in that it is more lasting and self-transformative. I'll expand upon this point much more later; I might even work on it as part of my undergraduate thesis.

God as Purpose

This is a paper I wrote for a philosophy class. I am far from satisfied with it, but I'm going to post it here for now because I know that if I wait for it to be perfect it never will be. I may use it as a nucleus for further discussion later on.

God as Purpose
The oft-asked question of theology and philosophy, “Does God exist?” is sometimes followed (even preceded) by inquiries into the nature of God itself. This is often done with the (implicit or explicit) assumption that God’s existence is in the affirmative (for example, the characters of David Hume’s Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion). While such an assumption is useful for thought experiment and is perhaps a necessary one to carry on any meaningful discourse concerning the nature of something, the assumption often leads one to retain many presuppositions about God that might best be abandoned in the interest of a truly objective analysis. There are many conceptions of God: animist, polytheist, monotheist, deist, pantheist, panentheist. The common traits such conceptions share are often few and far between, but the central idea that most religions express on the subject is the idea of an intelligent, otherworldly being or set of beings which create(s) the universe. Here too, there is variation: not all conceptions are all-powerful, benevolent, or even have intention in their act of creation.

It should be apparent, then, that while in order to have any meaningful discussion concerning the nature of something as ill-defined as God we must try to find its points of commonality, we must also understand that these are generalities which often have intense variation. Perhaps the best approach to understanding God, then, is to understand the reasons why the idea came into being. In fact, this point is one that is especially important: if we were to define ‘God’ as something without relevance to a person’s existence, it would be a strange occurrence for it to still be called ‘God’. This is because in most, if not all contexts that we have seen a god or gods arise as a significant entity within a culture, it has been to satisfy basic human needs for fulfillment. Religion as a cultural phenomenon is said to have arisen, among many other things, out of a need to find fulfillment, meaning in one’s existence.

In the debate on God’s existence, people will not be satisfied by an answer which is not relevant to their individual situation. A God which gives no sense of meaning or purpose to those who believe in it seems not a God at all, more a mere fact of the universe, like the laws of physics (or perhaps for better analogy, the law of karma in Indic faiths, which is taken as a metaphysical truth but is not worshipped or venerated).

In the beginning of Volume I, Part 2 of theologian Paul Tillich's Systematic Theology, Tillich states, "The basic theological question is the question of God. God is the answer to the question implied in being." Tillich’s account of religion was unorthodox and seems slightly inaccurate. He defined religion as the ‘ultimate concern’ in a person’s life, which seems not necessarily true; whereas one may be ultimately concerned with a religion, others may partake in traditional religious ritual yet not be ultimately concerned by it. However, Tillich was not attempting to work within current guidelines of language concerning religion, but sought to redefine those terms (or rather, to correct them, claiming they had been misunderstood and misused). In this sense, we can see religion as being something which occupies a special reality to those who participate in it. Anything less than ultimate concern is what is often referred to as the ‘exterior’ part of religion; showing all the signs of religious concern but not having that core essence.

So let us take Tillich’s basic point and run with it, that of God and religion as being something that must be understood as relevant to the individual. This is a point that the existentialists seemed to agree upon: Kierkegaard (an ardent Lutheran) felt that it was better to be a pagan with infinite faith than a Christian with only a passing interest in their religion. Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God is dead” was an attempt to show people that the implication of disbelief in God was that one was left adrift in a sea of despair, with no moral foundation (such as that created by ~2,000 years of Judeo-Christian tradition) and that we must therefore seek new values. Sartre said that, though God is an utterly absurd concept, It is a desire for completeness and self-sufficiency for man.

If God is the answer to the question implied in being, then defining God ultimately becomes a matter of understanding being, and what question is immediately implied within it. The question of being appears to be what Tillich describes as a "metaphysical shock", that one is thrust into a world of existence that is without inherent meaning or divine purpose. This is ultimately the heart of the concern in existentialist thought, what Kierkegaard describes as 'angst'.

Once one understands the question implied in being, then one is able to say what God is. But because of this very criterion, the definition becomes a matter which is completely relative to the individual. In order to distinguish what we mean, let us say that there are two relevant conceptions of God: the objective, which is something about the universe that remains independent of individual minds (although the possibility of verifying such conceptions can still remain problematic). Here we see the argumentation of philosophers and theologians: cosmological, ontological, teleological, etc. But there is also the level of which is meant to ask what concerns a person ultimately. This is the subjective conception, which is whatever the individual chooses to accept as their answer to the question implied in being. Having faith in God is to be concerned with It totally and ultimately, all other concerns subjected before this one. So the subjective definition of God is 'that thing which concerns one totally and ultimately.’

To demonstrate this difference, let us suppose that there is a certain conception of God which is contradictory or unverifiable. The theistic model of God displayed in the Abrahamic faiths often is faced with such inconsistencies or contradictions: omnipotent and all-loving but allowing suffering within the world; omniscient and omnipotent but allowing for free will; grounding morality yet not making it arbitrary. While these issues have of course been dealt with over the centuries with vigorous debate and reasoned argument, and theologians as such have developed more nuanced ideas concerning the nature of God, let us suppose that one has faith in this God. To the individual, an objective truth concerning this God (that it is contradictory) does little to the individual’s conviction in this God. It is only when one seriously considers such objective truths and relates them to oneself that the individual’s subjective conception of God is altered. But one may take this to be God regardless of such truths. In other words, while a conception of God can more-or-less be rendered objectively untrue, the fact that it is a matter of utmost importance and concern to an individual remains true, and in this sense this God still exists.

However, discussing the question of God's existence presents an interesting problem, because in raising such a question one must automatically assume many things about the very nature of God. While in common usage there are assumptions which concern certain characteristics (such as benevolence, omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence, etc.), the implicit assumption of any inquiry into God's existence is that God is something (almost always an intelligent being) which can be said to exist or not exist. While this may seem a trivial point, the implications are potentially far-reaching. For if God is something which may not exist, it cannot truly be the answer to a question implied in being. If God answers being, It must be universal to being. As Voltaire famously put it, “If God didn’t exist, it would be necessary to invent him.”

The difficulty, it seems, is in matching up the objective with the subjective; finding a conception of God which is universal to being and answers it as such. It must be a necessary conception: with the arising of being necessary comes the arising of the answer. What is the answer? Here we must admit that there is no easy answer, and herein we can admit controversy and complexity of the issues involved. Some advocate the idea of a single Creator deity, who actively participates in the universe. Others advocate a more aloof conception, of one who activated a single event (e.g., the Big Bang) and set into motion the entire universe, but does not interfere beyond this. Still others say that what is universally answering of being is the attainment of self-awareness, wisdom, and compassion. Whatever the answer may be, it must fit the criteria discussed above in order for the conception to succeed in solving being.

God, then, is the meaning that one chooses for their existence. This meaning may or may not be the correct meaning, in the sense that it may or may not solve the problems one faces as a temporal, fallible individual. However, it is up to the individual to find what gives them the meaning that answers these problems to their satisfaction.

References:
1. Tillich, Paul. Systematic Theology, Volume I. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951.
2. Wainwright, William. "Concepts of God". The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition). Edward N. Zalta (ed.). URL = .
3. Crowell, Steven, "Existentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2010 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = .